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"Public policy," Justice Burrough laconically remarked, "is
an unruly horse, and once you get astride of him you never know
where he will carry you." I But, as is so often the case, the horse
is unruly only when abused. When properly managed, lie travels
the road of sound precept to the goal of justice. And nowhere
has. this been better illustrated than in the case of monopolies,
contracts in restraint of trade, and restrictions upon competi-
tion.
The best definition of this "unruly horse" was given by Lord
Brougham when he said, "Public policy is that principle of the
law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the public or against public good." 2
Now it is obvious that as economic conditions change the stand-
ard of what is against public good must change with them. In
order therefore to understand the public policy laid down in
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,3 and to be able rightly to interpiet
that statute, a brief survey of prior economic development in its
relation to monopolies, contracts in restraint of trade, and re-
strictions upon competition, will be necessary.
'Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229 (1824).
2 Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 196 (1853).
'Act of July 2, i89o, C. 247 (26 Stat. L. 209).
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINES AS TO MONOPOLIES,
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE, AND RESTRICTIONS
UPON COMPETITION.
(a) Monopolies.
In early feudal times monopoly, in its broad sense, vas every-
where the rule. An incident of the feudal relationship was that
the tenant should go only to the lord of the manor for the
performance of certain services, and the practices known as
forestalling, regrating, and engrossing were common t until pro-
hibited by the Statute of 5 and 6 Edward VI (Ch. 14, par. 3). It
was not unnatural, therefore, that in later times the sovereign,
in order to raise revenue or requite services, should have granted
exclusive rights to the use or manufacture of things which were
before of common right-a monopoly in the old technical sense
of the term 5-in spite of early legislation against, such grants.6
This practice reached its height in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,
when, as Lord Macauley tells us,7 "there was scarcely a family
in the realm that did not feel itself aggrieved by the oppression
and extortion which the abuse naturally caused. Iron, oil, vine-
gar, coal, lard, . tarch, yam, leather, glass, could be bought only
at exorbitant prices."
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the abuse had
become so gross that in the famous case of Darcy v. Allein,8
the court was able to hold that the grant by the crown of the
exclusive right to make playing cards within the realm was against
public policy and void; and a score of years later the common
law, thus established, was re-enforced by the Statute of Monop-
' "The forestaller intercepted goods on their way to market and bought them
up so as to be able to command what price he chose when he got to the roarket.
The engrosser or regrator-for the two words had much the same meaning-
was a person, who, having bought goods wholesale, sold them again wholesale."
3 Stiph. Hist. of Crim. Law of Efig. i99.
'Cf. 3 Cokes Inst. i8I--"A monopoly is an institution, or allowance by the
king, by his grant, commission, or otherwise, to any person, or persons, bodies
politique or corporate, of, or 'for, the sole buying, selling, making, working, or
using, of anything, whereby any person, or persons, bodies politique or cor-
porate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had be-
fore, or hindered in their lawful trade."
,See Stat. 9, Ed. III, c. I (1335).
'Macaulay's History of England, Vol. I, p. 58.
'Coke, Part iI, 86 b (16o2) ; Noy, 173.
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olies,9 which declared that, with a few exceptions, all monop-
olies were "altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, and
so are and shall be utterly void and of none effect, and in no-
wise to be put in use or execution." This rule against the old
technical monopolies has been taken by us as a part of our
common law, and they have never existed in the United States."0
It is, therefore, in its broad modem sense that the term is used in
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
(b) Contracts in Restraint of Trade.
The doctrine against contracts in restraint of trade "-using
that phrase, as we shall, in its proper common law meaning-
was of much earlier origin than the rule against monopolies. It
was probably, in part at least, recognized by the Roman Law 12
though it has no place in the law of France.13  In England the
earliest reported case was decided in the reign of Henry V-
known as the Dyer's Case.1 4 The facts appear to have been that
a dyer in connection with the sale of his business bound himself
for six months not to exercise his trade in the same town as
the plaintiff. So strong was the policy at this time against all
contracts in restraint of trade that Judge Hull in refusing to en-
force the contract exclaimed, "Per Dieu, if the plaintiff were
here, he should go to prison till he had paid a fine to the king."
This extreme policy "seems to have originated in certain old
laws of England by which no person was allowed to engage
in particular kinds of trade or business without first serving a
lengthy apprenticeship. It was supposed to be contrary to pub-
lic policy for a person to bind himself not to engage in a business
' Stat. 21 James I, c. 3.
10 It should be noted that patents, copyrights, etc., are not true monopolies
because the privilege granted is not one that was previously enjoyed as of com-
mon right.
" A contract in restraint of trade in its technical sense is a contract, ancil-
lary to a principal contract to which the obligor is a party, not to engage in a
particular trade, business, or occupation. Cf. Noyes on Intercorporate Relations
(2d Ed.), par. 334; 2 Eddy on Combinations, par. 688. Similar contracts not
ancillary to a principal contract are always void. Chappell v. Brockway, 21
Wend. (N. Y.) 62 (1839).
" Greenhood on Public Policy, 687.
" See Rousillon v. Rousillon (i879), L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 351.
"Y. B. 2 H., v. Fol. 5, pl. 26 (415).
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for which he had thus become qualified, as the public would be
deprived of the benefit of this training and experience in such
business, and the tendency of the contract, on account of the
prohibition as to other kinds of business, would be to take from
him the means of support and reduce him to the position of a
pauper." 15 Although the rule continued in all its strictness till
the beginning of the seventeenth century,16 economic conditions
were in the meantime undergoing vast changes, and it was be-
coming apparent that so rigid a doctrine was interfering with
every day transactions and was making it impossible for a man
adequately to dispose of the good *ill of his business. Ac-
cordingly, before the middle of the seventeenth century con-
tracts in partial restraint of trade-i. e. limited as to time and
place-where enforced,17 and in the leading case of Mitchell v.
Reynolds "I the doctrine was firmly established that contracts in
restraint of trade would be upheld if (i) partial and (2) based
upon an adequate consideration. It remained, however, for
Chief Justice Tindall in the case of 'Homer v. Graves "o to lay
down the true common law test of the validity of such contracts
---. C.
"whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection
to the interest of the party in favour of whom it is given, and not
so large as to interfere with the interests of the public. What-
ever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party,
can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive; and if
oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable."
Thus the exigencies of the principal contract furnish the
standard of reasonableness of the restraining contract. That
this test is elastic enough to meet changing economic conditions
was illustrated in Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Co. 20 where,
in the case of a world-wide business, a restraint unlimited as to
space was upheld.
"Wright v. Rider, 36 Cal. 342 (1868).
"8 Colgate v. Bacheler, I Croke's Rep. 872 (162).
'Rogers v. Parry, 2 Bulstrode 136 (1635).
i P. Wins. 18i-s. c. I Smith's Leading Cases 705 (1711).
197 Bing. 743 (1831).
20 App. Cas. (1894) 535; 63 L. J. Ch. 9o8.
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While the American courts have not yet applied the above
test so as to uphold restraining contracts which are unlimited as
to space, the general development of the law of contracts in
restraint of trade has been much the same in this country as in
England.
(c) Restrictions upon Competition.
Whether or not restrictions upon competition are regarded
as against public policy depends upon the answer to the economic
question, "Is free competition advantageous ?"-Upon this ques-
tion there is wide divergence of opinion even, as we shall see,
among the justices of the United States Supreme Court. In
England the judicial view-which in the long run must reflect
public opinion-has not been impressed with the value of free
competition and accordingly the seeds of the doctrine against
the suppression of competition -have there usually fallen by the
wayside. 2' In the United States, on the other hand, the strong
trend of opinion has been in favor of freedom of competition,
and the cry has gone up on every side that- "competition is the
life of trade." In a general way the test of the legality of a re-
striction upon competition seems to be its extent-i. e. whether
it amounts to a practical control of the market for a useful com-
modity or for services 2 2-while the proper test of the validity
of a contract in restraint of trade is its reasonableness. In the
case of restrictions upon competition the test of reasonableness
is too uncertain as there is no principal contract by which a
standard of reasonableness may be fixed. The economic con-
ditions that require rules as to the restriction of competition are
comparatively modem, and the origin and development of such
rules are entirely distinct from those of doctrine as to con-
tracts in restraint of trade; and furthermore, it is obvious that
the tests of legality in the two cases are by no means identical.
It is unfortunate, therefore, that the court should have fallen into
the way of using the technical words "contracts in restraint
"Wickens v. Evans, 3 Younge & J. 318 (1829); Hare v.-L. & N. W. Ry.
Co., 2 Johnson & Hemming 8 (1861).
"Cooke on Combinations, par. ix8 ff.; Noyes on Intercorporate Relations,
par. 352 ff.
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of trade" in their broad literal meaning, and, by use of the
syllogism that "competition is the life of trade, therefore every
contract that suppresses competition restrains trade" have ap-
plied them to restrictions upon competition. In some cases this
has led to the error of applying the test of reasonableness to re-
strictions upon competition, 23 and seems to have been the cause of
some of the differences of opinion in the United States Supreme
Court as to the interpretation of the Sherman Act.24 The misuse
of these words, has, however, been so frequent in both decisions
and legislation that it now seems impossible to correct it. That
the phrase "restraint of trade" is used in its broad significance in
the Sherman Act and includes restrictions upon competition can-
not be questioned.
II. THE SHERMAN ACT.
The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a time of
great economic upheaval and adjustment to new conditions-an
era of frenzied combination. Everywhere captains of industry
were centralizing and combining their enterprises, and every-
where the cry was going up that competition ("the life of trade")
Was being smothered by combination. The train of popular in-
dignation was laid. The spark only was needed to make it
burst into flame. The formation of the great industrial trusts-
technical trusts from which the whole problem has received its
name-struck that spark, and the flame was not quenched until
Congress passed the Act of July 2, 189o-commonly known as
the Sherman Act or the Anti-Trust Act. Its provisions, are too
well known to require detailed repetition here. Suffice. it -to say,
that it makes criminal (i) every contract, combination or con-
spiracy, in restraint of territorial, interstate, or foreign com-
merce; (2) every monopoly of or attempt to monopolize terri-
torial, interstate or foreign commerce; and that it provides
that the Attorney General of the United States may proceed in
" Cf. Collins v. Locke, 4 App. Cas. 674 (1879).
'Cf. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897); U. S. v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898) ; U. S. v. Northern Securities Co., 193
U. S. 197 (x94).
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equity for an injunction against infringement of the act, and that
those injured by violations of the act may recover treble damages.
We shall now examine briefly the chief cases decided by the
Uftited States Supreme Court under this statute.
The first case--commonly known as the Sugar Trust Case 25
-involved the legality of the acquisition by the American Sugar
Refining Company-controlling sixty-five per cent of the sugar
refined in the United States--of four Philadelphia refineries-
controlling thirty-three per cent-stock in the former corpora-
tion being given in payment. The court held (Harlan, J. dissent)
that the act applied only to transactions which directly affected
interstate commerce; that, so far as the record showed, the com-
bination here affected only manufacture; and that commerce was
therefore only indirectly affected. While no doubt has ever been
thrown on the distinction between commerce and manufacture
subsequent cases have greatly diminished the apparent importance
of .this decision.
In the next case-United States v., The Trans-Missouri
Freight Association 20-the Supreme Court held that a combi-
nation of fifteen competing railroads, practically monopolizing
the through traffic from the Mississippi and the Missouri to the
Pacific, to fix rates by means of a central committee, restricted
competition in, and directly affected interstate commerce, and
therefore was in restraint of trade and void under the Sherman
Act. The two main questions were (i) whether the act ap-
plies to railroadsand (2) whether it includes reasonable as well
as unreasonable restraints of trade. The majority answered both
questions in the affirmative, while a strong minority, composed
of Justices White, Field, Gray and Shiras, answered both in the
negative. The court further held that a combination need not
be in form similar to a trust in order to fall within the act.
The following year the same majority held illegal a some-
what similar combination in the case of the United States v.
Joint Traffic Associations. 2 7 The association consisted of thirty-
one railroads engaged in transportation between Chicago and the
"U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
166 U. S. 290 (897).
171 U. S. 5o5 (1898).
UO 3./- tIY.V. . ZLV..J I 1 .(ii 3z2ElVF .V 1VJ1 I-1X.L 1 Z U l .I
Atlantic Coast, and its object was to have all changes from
established rates emanate from the directors of the companies
instead of from the traffic managers. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that the combination was practically identical with
that in the Trans-Missouri Case, reiterated the propositions
therein laid down, and held that the act is constitutional under
the Commerce Clause.
During the same term the Supreme Lourt was called upon
to determine the validity of the combinations involved in the
Live Stock Exchange Cases.28 " The facts in these two cases were
almost the same-the main difference being that the members
of the Kansas City Exchange were commission merchants while
the members of the Traders Exchange purchased and sold cattle
for themselves. In each case the rules of the association forbade
members from dealing with competing non-members and im-
posed minor restrictions on the methods of doing business. The
court (Harlan, J. dissent) held that the combinations did not
directly-affect interstate commerce and therefore were not within
the act.
At this time it would have appeared to superficial observers
that the Supreme Court would apply the Sherman Act to inter-
state carriers but would never apply it to industrial combina-
tions. It was not long, however, before such persons were un-
deceived, for the following year the court declared illegal an
association of six pipe manufacturers doing business throughout
a large part of the United States which they divided into "free"
and "pay" territory.29 In the "free territory" the members com-
peted with each other. In the "pay territory" the price on each
contract was fixed by a central committee, and the contract was
then given by the association to the member agreeing to pay
the largest bonus thereon to the other members, some. of whom
would usually, for the sake of appearances, be required to sub-
mit bids higher than the one agreed upon. That this combination
controlled the market throughout a large territory was clearly
proved. The court held that the direct effect of the agreement
Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. U. S., 171 U. S.
6o4 (i898).
2' Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
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was to regulate interstate commerce and that the case was there-
fore not covered by that of the United States v. E. C. Knight Co.
For three years the Supreme Court was not called upon to
interpret the Sherman Act. Then in i9o2 it held unanimously
(three justices taking no part) that the act "clearly does not
refer to that kind of a restraint of interstate conimerce which
may arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the
assignee or licensee of a patent by the owner thereof restrict-
ing the terms upon which the article may be used and the price
to be demanded therefor." 30
In February, 1904, the Supreme Court, in an action against
a western association of tile and mantel dealers for treble dam-
ages, reiterated the principles laid down in the Addyston Pipe
Case. The association was composed of dealers in tiles in Cali-
fornia and of manufacturers in other States, and according to the
agreement the manufacturers could sell to outside dealers only at
prohibitive prices. The combination controlled the market, and
the Supreme Court held' that it directly affected interstate com-
merce and was therefore void.
Up to this point the Supreme Court had laid down the
distinction between indirect and direct effects on interstate com-
merce; and by the standard of the Anti-Trust Act it had judged
shameless and undraped combinations both of railroads and in-
dustrial plants and had condemned them. But now there was
brought before it a combination of competing railroads draped
with becoming modesty under the veil of a holding corporation.
The Northern Securities Company was to be condemned or ac-
quitted, and in March, 19o4, the epoch-making judgment was
rendered.32 The facts are too well known to need repeating.
Four justices (Harlan, Brown, Day and McKenna) held that
the transaction was in essence a combination; that it directly af-
fected interstate commerce and suppressed competition and was
therefore void. On the other hand Chief Justice Fuller and three
associate justices (White, Peckham and Holmes) held (i) "that
there is no combination in restraint of trade until something
"Bement v. National Arrow Co., i86'U. S. 7o (i9o2).
Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (i9o4).
"U. S. v. Northern Securities Co., 193 U. S. I97 (i9o4).
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is done with the intent to exclude strangers to the combination
from competing with it in some part of the business which it
carries on," and (2) that the ownership of stock in competing
railroads does not involve interstate commerce. Justice Brewer
held the balance of power, and, though he reversed his former
opinion that the act applies to reasonable as well as unreasonable
restraints, came to the conclusion that the restraint was here
unreasonable and tipped the scales against the Northern Securi-
ties Company. The decision has never been qualified in any
way and is generally accepted as sound both logically and econom-
ically.
After reiterating the doctrine that the Anti-Trust Act has
no application to contracts not directly affecting interstate com-
merce, 33 the Supreme Court, in the following year, unanimously
declared the Beef Trust an illegal combination. 3 4 The combina-
tion here was among packers controlling six-tenths of the fresh
meat supply of the United States. They agreed to bid only in con-
junction with each other, to restrict shipments, establish uniform
rules of credit, etc., with the intention of monopolizing the trade.
The court had no difficulty in holding that the commerce involved
was interstate and directly affected by the combination in ques-
tion.
During the same year the court held that the acquisition
of quotations on wheat and their distribution to persons ap-
proved, excluding bucket-shops, was not a monopoly or combi-
nation to suppress competitiofi, but "simply a restraint on the
acquisition for illegal purposes of the fruits of the plaintiff's
work." 3'
In the following year, 19o6, the court rendered its first
decision as to the application of the Sherman Act to a. contract
in reasonable restraint of trade-using that term technically-
and unanimously sustained it."' The contract was a typical one
-the vendor of steamers plying between certain points on the
'Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618 (i9o 4).
Swift and Co. v. U. S., I96 U. S. 375 (1905).
'Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (195o).
"Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179 (19o6). Accord: Monon-
gahela River Con. Coal, etc., Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288 (1904).
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Ohio River agreeing not to operate steamers between those points
for five years, and the vendee agreeing to maintain certain rates.
In the course of the opinion Justice Holmes said:
"Whatever differences of opinion there may have been with'
regard to the scope of the act of July 2, 189o, there has been no
intimation from any one, we believe, that such a contract, made
as part of the sale of a business, and not as a device to control
commerce, would fall within the act. On the contrary, it has
been suggested repeatedly that such a contract is not within
the letter or spirit of the statute."
Two years later the court made it clear in the case of Shaw-
nee Compress Co. v. Anderson 37 that such ancillary contracts
would not be sanctioned if in unreasonable restraint of trade.
In this case the Shawnee Company leased its property to the
Gulf Co. covenanting that it would not "directly or indirectly
engage in the compressing of cotton within fifty miles of any
plant operated by the tenant." The case, as Justice McKenna
said:
"presents something more than the acquisition by the Gulf Co.
of another compress-of a mere addition to its business. It
presents acts in aid of a scheme of monopoly .......... The
principle (that the sale of the good will of a business with an
accompanying agreement not to engage in a similar business is
valid) is well understood. The restraint upon one of the parties
must not be greater than protection to the other party requires."
Two months before the above decision was rendered the
Supreme Court, in the Danbury I-latter's Case,"' held that a
combination of laborers to prevent, by means of boycotts, etc.,
the interstate, as well as the intrastate, transportation of the
plaintiff's goods was void under the Sherman Act and allowed re-
covery of treble damages. The unanimous opinion of the court
was rendered by Chief Justice Fuller, who said:
"If the purposes of the combination were, as alleged, to
prevent any interstate transportation at all, the fact that the
means operated at one end before physical transportation com-
31209 U. S. 423 (19o8).
T Loewe v. Lawlor, 2o8 U. S. 274 (19o8).
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menced and at the other end after the physical transportation
ended was imrhaterial.
"Nor can the act in question be held inapplicable because
defendants were not themselves engaged in interstate commerce.
The act made no distinction between classes. It provided that
'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade
was illegal."
The latest case decided by the Supreme Court under the
Sherman Act involved not so much the illegality of the combina-
tion-the Wall Paper Trust-which was evident,-as its right to
recover on a contract made in accordance with the terms of the
illegal combination. A divided court held that there could be no
recovery inasmuch as the contract was "made up, within the
knowledge of both seller and buyer, with direct reference to and
in execution of certain agreements under which an illegal combi-
nation represented by the seller was organized." 39
An examination of these sixteen cases reveals the following
facts. First, that the Sherman Act does not apply if interstate
commerce is not directly affected. Upon this principle it was
held inapplicable in four cases, viz: the Sugar Trust Case, the
Live Stock Exchange Cases, and the Barber Asphalt Case.
Second, that the Sherman Act does not apply to contracts between
a patentee and his licensee restricting commerce in a patented
article, or to contracts restricting the distribution of news ac-
quired to such as would make lawful use of it. Upon this prin-
ciple the contracts were upheld in two cases-viz: the National
Harrow Case and Board of Trade v. Christie Co.
Of the remaining ten cases, two-the Cincinnati Packet
Case and the Shawnee Compress Case-involved true contracts
in restraint of trade, and were decided by in effect applying the
common law test of reasonableness. The other eiglit involved
combinations to restrict competition, each of which was con-
demned by an application of the proper test-i. e. the test of
extent.
That the Sherman Act has changed the common law as it
'Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight and Sons, 212 U. S. 227 (o9);
Cf. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, with which the minority
held the decision was irreconcilable.
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existed in i89o cannot be doubted, for the common law had
confused true contracts in restraint of trade with contracts and
combinations to restrict competition, and the courts had often
fallen into the error of applying the test of reasonableness to re-
itrictions upon competition. It is submitted, however, that the
Sherman Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court, instead of
being revolutionary, as so many people have claimed, has, in
reality merely corrected an error into which the courts had fallen
-the error of confusing restraints of trade with restrictions upon
competition. When the court has said that the act applies to
reasonable as well as to unreasonable restraints of trade it has,
in reality, merely emphasized the fact that the test of reasonable-
ness is not the proper one by which to judge restrictions upon
competition. When true restraints of trade have come before it,
the court has not hesitated to judge them by the standard of
reasonableness.
With regard to the second section of the act it should be
noted that "the idea of monopoly is not now confined to a grant
of privilege. It is understood to include a condition produced
by the acts of mere individuals. Its dominant thought now is,
to quote another, 'the notion of exclusiveness or unity', in other
words the suppression of competition by the unification of inter-
est or management, or, it may be, -through agreement and con-
cert of action. And the purpose is so definitely the control of
prices, that monopoly has been defined to be unified tactics with
regard to prices." 40 As so used monopoly includes illegal com-
binations to restrict competition, or in the words of the first
section "combinations in restraint of trade or commerce," and
it would seem that, as stated by Justice Holmes in his dissenting
opinion in the Northern Securities Case:
"all that is added to the first section by section 2 is that the penal-
ties are imposed upon every single person who, without combina-
tion, monopolizes or attempts to monopolize commerce among
the States, and that the liability is extended to attempting to
monopolize any part of such trade or commerce." 41
"National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U. S. 129 (i9o5).
"1 93 U. S. 197, 404 (1904).
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Thus construing the Sherman Act the Supreme Court has
declared illegal (i) open combinations to restrict competition
among competing interstate carriers (Trans-Missouri Freight
Case), (2) open combinations of manufacturers to restrict com-
petition where the effect on interstate commerce is direct
(Addyston Pipe Case) and (3) combinations, effected by means
of holding companies, to restrict competition among competing
interstate carriers (Northern Securities Case). At the present
term it will be called upon to decide, in either the Standard Oil
Case or the American Tobacco Case, the validity of (4) com-
binations of manufacturers, effected by means of holding com-
panies, to restrict competition where the effect on interstate com-
merce is direct. Both combinations have already been declared
illegal,; the latter by the Circuit Court for the Southern District
of New York,4 2 the former by the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri,4 3 and it seems probable that in both cases
the judgment will be affirmed.
If the government is successful in these suits new methods
of combination will doubtless be tried. The most obvious of
these is the formation of a giant corporation to take over the
entire properties of the combining companies which will there-
upon go out of existence. Although it is thought by many that
such a transaction cannot be differentiated from a bona fide sale,
in which ther.e is no element of combination, the better view
would seem to be that if the transaction is in essence a combina-
tion, though veiled under the cloak of a sale of corporate prop-
erty, it is illegal under the Sherman Act. As stated by Judge
Noyes:
"Whether a transaction between corporations or between
individuals amounts to a sale or to a combination depends upon
whether the vendor actually parts with all interest in the prop-
erty sold or merely changes the. form of the investment. A
bona fide sale of a plant for cash or its equivalent possesses none
of the elements of combination. On the other hand an exchange
of one plant for an interest in united plants possesses all the ele-
ments of combination. How this exchange is effected is im-
" U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 7oo (igo8).
" U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., x73 Fed. 177 (i9o9).
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material. An ordinary method is to pay the purchase price in
the shares of the corporate combination. Sometimes these shares
are delivered to the vendor corporation; sometimes they are dis-
tributed directly among its stockholders. It is not material
which course is taken. In such a transaction the stockholders-
the ultimate owners--stand for their corporation." 44
The mere fact that the combining corporations go out of
existence doesnot determine that the transaction is not a combi-
nation. If a scientific illustration may be pardoned a close
analogy might be drawn between such a transaction and the
combination of chemical compounds. The combining sub-
stances themselves cease to exist and their atoms rearrange them-
selves to form the resulting substance. A chemical as distin-
guished from a mere physical combination has taken place but
it is none the less a combination.
If a Federal incorporation Act, such as was recommended
by President Taft in his message to Congress on January 7th,
19IO, is passed it may well be that the danger of this form of
combination will be obviated by provisions for strict federal
control, and the act may thus repeal the Sherman Act pro tanto.
Until such federal control is secured the dangers in this form of
combination are almost .as great as in the case of a holding
corporation.
One word remains to be said with regard to proposed
amendments to the Anti-Trust Act. The one most often agitated
is the insertion in section (i) of the word "unreasonable" be-
fore the phrase "contracts, combinations, in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce." If
the position taken in this article be correct the effect of such a
change would be to go back to the error into which the common
law of 189o had fallen--i. e. to apply the test of reasonableness
to restrictions upon competition. And, furthermore, in the words
of President Taft:
"this is to put into the hands of the court a power impossible to
exercise on any consistent principle which will insure the uni-"
formity of decision essential to just judgment. It is to thrust upon
"Noyes on Intercorporate Relations (2d Ed.), p. 638, n. i. Cf. ibid 731,
n.Y. U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700, 718 (i9o8).
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the courts a burden that they have no precedent to enable them to
carry, and to give them a power approaching the arbitrary, the
abuse of which might involve our whole judicial system in dis-
aster." 45
Another proposed amendment, however, merits more serious
consideration. The act in its present form forbids all agreements
between competing carriers with regard to rates. And yet some
co-operation in this respect seems necessary. The result of the
decisions in the Trans-Missouri Freight Case and the Joint
Traffic Case has been, in some instances at least, the making of
"gentlemen's agreements." Such a method of doing business
is in many ways undesirable. To remedy this the passage 6f an
Act providing that traffic agreements, when approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, shall be lawful and-enforcible
has been suggested. While such an amendment is conservative
and for many reasons. desirable, it should be remembered that
the Sherman Act "has been on the Statute book now for two
decades, and the Supreme Court in more than a dozen opini6ns
has construed it in application to various phases of business
combinations and in reference to various subjects matter," 45 and
that "the value of a statute which is rendered more and more
certain in its meaning by a series of decisions of the Supreme
Court furnishes a strong reason for leaving the act as it is." 4.5
Harold Evans.
Philadelphia, Pa.
President Taft's Message to Congress, January 7th, I9io.
